
# drm

ARM

## How Can You Trust Formally Verified Software?

Alastair Reid

Arm Research @alastair\_d\_reid



#### Software


## US aviation authority: Boeing 787 bug could cause 'loss of control'

More trouble for Dreamliner as Federal Aviation Administration warns glitch in control unit causes generators to shut down if left powered on for 248 days



(1) The Boeing 787 has four generator-control units that, if powered on at the same, could fail simultaneously and cause a complete electrical shutdown. Photograph: Elaine Thompson/AP


https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/01/us-aviation-authority-boeing-787-dreamliner-bug-could-cause-loss-of-control



#### **Current Description**


The (1) TLS and (2) DTLS implementations in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1g do not properly handle Heartbeat Extension packets, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory via crafted packets that trigger a buffer over-read, as demonstrated by reading private keys, related to d1\_both.c and t1\_lib.c, aka the Heartbleed bug.

Source: MITRE Last Modified: 04/07/2014 + View Analysis Description



Source: MITRE Last Modified: 04/07/2014 + View Analysis Description

Buffer over-read vulnerabilities	
WE-2008-3803   A "logic error" in Cisco IOS 12.0 through 12.4, when a Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) VPN with extended communities is configured in the second transfer of the seco	red, stic
CVE-2007-2444 Logic error in the SID /// CVE-2007-0414 CVE-2007-041	
CVE-2006-   CVE-2017-9988   The readEnconner denial of service to the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service to the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service to the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service to the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service to the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service to the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service to the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service to the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service to the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service (over the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service (over the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service (over the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service (over the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a "double the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a "double the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a remote denial of service (over the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a "double the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a "double the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a "double the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a "double the pinnacle.c in the Line unspecified other impact lead to a "double the pinnacle.c in the line unspecified other impact lead to a "double the pinnacle.c in the line unspecified other impact lead to a "double the pinnacle.c in	
The (1) TLS and CVE-2017-9985 The (1) TLS and CVE-2017-9985 The subject of the value of a message que the value	sion at
bug.   CVE-2017-9843   CVE-2017-9843     cve-2017-9843   CVE-2017-9843	bleed
Source:   In all Querepace is invalid, or userspace is invalid, or userspace is invalid, or userspace is invalid, or from userspace is invalid	



	Auto2017-9953   There is an invalid free in Image:::printIFDStructure that leads to a remote denial of service attack.     Auto2017-9935   In LibTIFF 4.0.8, there is a heap-based buffer overflow in the table of service attack.     Auto2017-9789   In LibTIFF 4.0.8, there is a heap-based buffer overflow in the t2p_write_pdf function fault in Exiv 2.0.26. A crafted in t2p_free in t2p_free. Given these possibilities or table of the table of table of table of the table of
	CVE-201
	Input will lead to a remote denial of service attack.     In LibTIFF 4.0.8, there is a heap-based buffer overflow in the table to a Segmentation fault in Exiv2 0.26. A crafted in TIFFCleanup, an invalid free in TIFFClose or table, a crafted TIFF document can lead to a sometimes access memory after it has being free. Given these possibilities, is probable.     CVE-2017-9685   In all Qualcomm products     VE-2017-9684   In all Qualcomm products
Buffer	In LibTIFF 4.0.2
	bounds, there is a b
	CVE-2010 to read in TIFEC
	<u>CVE-2017-9789</u> W
迷 CVE	When under stress, closing control of the free in time to the top write pdf function fault in Exiv2 0.26. A cross
	Joint Sometimes access, closing
•	In all Qualcomm products and the second to t
	CVE-2017-9684   In all Qualcomm products   In all Qualcomm products </th
	In LibTIFF 4.0.8, there is a heap-based buffer overflow in the tasks to a Segmentation fault in Exiv2 0.26. A crafted in Service attack.     In LibTIFF 4.0.8, there is a heap-based buffer overflow in the tasks to a Segmentation fault in Exiv2 0.26. A crafted in TIFFCleanup, an invalid free in TIFFClose or tasks.     In LibTIFF 4.0.8, there is a heap-based buffer overflow in the tasks.     VE-2017-9789     VE-2017-9685     In all Qualcomm products     In all Qualcomm product
Modif	<i>CVF</i> and <i>lead p r lead p r r r r r r r r r r</i>
	<i>CVE Ln Ln Ln Ln Ln Ln Ln Ln</i>
CVE-2017-9992	
	Heap-based buffer overflow in the decode_and the second start of t
	before 2.8.12, 5.0.x before a denial of service (application 3.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application 3.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application have unspecified other impact via a crafted file. Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddec.c in Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in a USB
	have unspecified other impact Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddecide 3.3.x Heap-based buffer overflow in the xwd_decode_frame function in libavcodec/xwddecide 3.3.x FFmpe(
CVE-2017-9991	FFmpe
	JDIE JDIE
	before possibl Buffer overflow vulnerabilities n libavcodec/xpmdec.c in possibl Buffer overflow vulnerabilities of service (application plorer.aspx2 allows allows the by
CVE-2017-9990	FFmpeg 3.3 before 3.3.1 allows remote attackers to a crafted file. (rash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file. (rash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file. (sion any any any any any any any any any an
	crash) or possibly have and in the hool motion in inpegvices_me any ision
	here based butter overnow in the set of convice attack,
CVE-2017-9987	libay 12.1. A claited input comment comment comment
	the huffer overflow vulnerability has been in a dling of remote RDP clipboard content in a page
CVE-2017-9948	7 36 before 7.37, involving MSFTEDIT.DLL mismananing
	within the message box. within the message box. service (process) service (process) s
Source: MITE	
3	The <b>Last IVIO</b> <u>CVE-2017-9680</u> In all Queerspace is invalid? from userspace is user user user userspace user user user user user user user use
	CVE-2017-9631 A Null Pointes 7.1 and prior. The service for logging a denial of service for lo
	CVET 201 and causing a deviate to run when the

## **Formal verification**

**Of libraries and apps** 





#### **Of compilers**

COMPCERT





#### **Of operating systems**






arm

Fonseca et al., An Empirical Study on the Correctness of Formally Verified Distributed Systems, Eurosys '17




Fonseca et al., An Empirical Study on the Correctness of Formally Verified Distributed Systems, Eurosys '17




## **Takeaway #1: 3 key questions to ask**

- 1. What specifications does your proof rely on?
- 2. Why do you trust those specifications?
- 3. Does anybody else use these specifications?

#### **Takeaway #2: Specifications must have multiple uses**



#### **Takeaway #2: Specifications must have multiple uses**



## How can you trust formally verified software?

#### How can you trust formally verified software?

- Specifications are part of the TCB
- 3 key questions
- Specifications must have multiple users
- How can you trust formal specifications?
  - Testing specifications
  - Verifying processors
  - Verifying specifications

How can you trust formally verified software?

"Trustworthy Specifications of the ARM v8-A and v8-M architecture," FMCAD 2016

# Creating trustworthy specifications

arm

© 2017 Arm Limited

### The state of most processor specifications

Large (1000s of pages)

Broad (10+ years of implementations, multiple manufacturers) Complex (exceptions, weak memory, ...)

Informal (mostly English prose)

We are all just learning how to (retrospectively) formalize specifications

## **Arm Processor Specifications**

A-class (phones, tablets, servers, ...)

#### 6,000 pages 40,000 line formal specification

Instructions (32/64-bit) Exceptions / Interrupts Memory protection Page tables Multiple privilege levels System control registers Debug / trace

#### **M-class** (microcontrollers, IoT)

#### 1,200 pages 15,000 line formal specification

Instructions (32-bit) Exceptions / Interrupts Memory protection <del>Page tables</del> Multiple privilege levels System control registers Debug / trace

## **English prose**

R<sub>JRJC</sub>

Exit from lockup is by any of the following:

- A Cold reset.
- A Warm reset.
- Entry to Debug state.
- Preemption by a higher priority exception.

R<sub>VGNW</sub>

Entry to lockup from an exception causes:

- Any Fault Status Registers associated with the exception to be updated.
- No update to the exception state, pending or active.
- The PC to be set to 0xEFFFFFE.
- EPSR.IT to be become UNKNOWN.

In addition, HFSR.FORCED is not set to 1.

#### **Pseudocode**

#### Encoding A1 ARMv4\*, ARMv5T\*, ARMv6\*, ARMv7

ADC{S}<c> <Rd>, <Rn>, <Rm>{, <shift>}

31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

cond 0 0 0 0 1 0 1	l S Rn	Rd	imm5 type	0	Rm
--------------------	--------	----	-----------	---	----

if Rd -- '1111' && S -- '1' then SEE SUBS PC, LR and related instructions; d - UInt(Rd); n - UInt(Rn); m - UInt(Rm); setflags - (S -- '1'); (shift\_t, shift\_n) - DecodeImmShift(type, imm5); if ConditionPassed() then EncodingSpecificOperations(); shifted - Shift(R[m], shift\_t, shift\_n, APSR.C); (result, carry, overflow) - AddWithCarry(R[n], shifted, APSR.C); if d -- 15 then // Can only occur for ARM encoding

ALUWritePC(result): // setflags is always FALSE here

else

R[d] - result; if setflags then

APSR.N - result<31>;

APSR.Z = IsZeroBit(result);

APSR.C - carry;

APSR.V - overflow;

## Arm Architecture Specification Language (ASL)

Indentation-based syntax

Imperative

**First-order** 

Strongly typed (type inference, polymorphism, dependent types)


**Bit-vectors** 

Unbounded integers

Infinite precision reals

Arrays, Records, Enumerations

#### Exceptions



## **Architectural Conformance Suite**


Processor architectural compliance sign-off

Large

- v8-A 11,000 test programs, > 2 billion instructions
- v8-M 3,500 test programs, > 250 million instructions


Thorough

Tests dark corners of specification



arm


## **v8-M**



## **Measuring architecture coverage of tests**

#### Untested: op1\*op2 == -3.0, FPCR.RND=-Inf

	t	vits(N) FPRSqrtStepFused(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2)
TESTED		assert N IN {32, 64};
TESTED		bits(N) result;
TESTED		op1 = FPNeg(op1); // per FMSUB/FMLS
TESTED		(type1,sign1,value1) = FPUnpack(op1, FPCR);
TESTED		(type2,sign2,value2) = FPUnpack(op2, FPCR);
TESTED		(done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, FPCR);
TESTED	TESTED TESTED	if !done then
TESTED		inf1 = (type1 == FPType_Infinity);
TESTED		inf2 = (type2 == FPType Infinity);
TESTED		zero1 = (type1 == FPType Zero);
TESTED		zero2 = (type2 == FPType Zero);
TESTED	TESTED TESTED	if (inf1 && zero2)    (zero1 && inf2) then
TESTED		result = FPOnePointFive('0');
	•	elsif inf1    inf2 then
TESTED		result = FPInfinity(sign1 EOR sign2, N);
	•	else
		// Fully fused multiply-add and halve
TESTED		result value = $(3.0 + (value1 * value2)) / 2.0;$
TESTED	UNEXECUTED TESTED	if result value $== 0.0$ then
		// Sign of exact zero result depends on rounding mode
UNEXECUTE		sign = if FPCRRounding() == FPRounding NEGINF then '1' else '0';
UNEXECUTED		result = FPZero(sign, N);
	•	else
TESTED		result = FPRound(result_value, FPCRRounding());
TESTED		return result:
	•	



"End to End Verification of ARM processors with ISA Formal," CAV 2016

# Formal verification of processors

arm

© 2017 Arm Limited

## Checking an instruction






The Architecture for the Digital World®


**ARM**Research


# Checking an instruction














arm



#### **ARM**Research

The Architecture for the Digital World®

## **Arm CPUs verified with ISA-Formal**


A-class	R-class	M-class
Cortex-A53	Cortex-R52	Cortex-M4
Cortex-A32	Next generation	Cortex-M7
Cortex-A35		Cortex-M33
Cortex-A55		Next generation
Next generation		Cambridge Projects

#### Rolling out globally to other design centres

Sophia, France - Cortex-A75 (partial)

Austin, USA - TBA

Chandler, USA - TBA



"Who guards the guards? Formal Validation of ARM v8-M Specifications" OOPSLA 2017

# Formal validation of specifications

arm

© 2017 Arm Limited



Last year: audited all accesses to privileged registers

- Specification: Added missing privilege checks
- Testsuite: Added new tests to test every privilege check
- Formal testbench: Verify every check

This year: add new instruction but accidentally omit privilege check

How many tests in the test suite will fail on new specification?

### **Executable Specification**

Defines what *is* allowed

- Animation → Check spec matches expectation
- Testable → Compare spec against implementation

### **Executable Specification**

Defines what *is* allowed

- Animation → Check spec matches expectation
- Testable → Compare spec against implementation

Does not define what is not allowed

e.g., Impossible states, impossible actions/transitions, security properties No redundancy

Problem when extending specification

### **Creating a specification of disallowed behaviour**

Where to get a list of disallowed behaviour?

How to formalise this list?

How to formally validate specification against spec of disallowed behaviour?

Exit from lockup is by any of the following:

- A Cold reset.
- A Warm reset.
- Entry to Debug state.
- Preemption by a higher priority processor exception.

### Rule R

### **State Change X** by any of the following:

- Event A
- Event B
- State Change C
- Event D

### Rule R

### **State Change X** by any of the following:

- Event A
- Event B
- State Change C
- Event D

And cannot happen any other way

### Rule R

### **State Change X** by any of the following:

- Event A
- Event B
- State Change C
- Event D
- And cannot happen any other way

## Rule R: $X \rightarrow A \lor B \lor C \lor D$

Event A **Event B** State Change C Event D © 2017 Arm Limited

State Change X

Exit from lockup

A Cold reset

A Warm reset

Entry to Debug state

Preemption by a higher priority processor exception Fell(LockedUp)

Called(TakeColdReset)

Called(TakeReset)

Rose(Halted)

Called(ExceptionEntry)

Exit from lockup is by any of the following:

- A Cold reset.
- A Warm reset.
- Entry to Debug state.
- Preemption by a higher priority processor exception.

Exit from lockup is by any of the following:

- A Cold reset.
- A Warm reset.
- Entry to Debug state.
- Preemption by a higher priority processor exception.

Fell(LockedUp) → Called(TakeColdReset) ∨ Called(TakeReset) ∨ Rose(Halted)

v Called(ExceptionEntry)

Exit from lockup is by any of the following:

- A Cold reset.
- A Warm reset.
- Entry to Debug state.
- Preemption by a higher priority processor exception.

Fell(LockedUp) → Called(TakeColdReset) ∨ Called(TakeReset) ∨ Rose(Halted) ∨ Called(ExceptionEntry)

\_\_Called\_TakeColdReset = FALSE; \_\_Called\_TakeReset = FALSE; \_\_Called\_TakeExceptionEntry = FALSE; \_\_Past\_LockedUp = LockedUp; \_\_Past\_Halted = Halted;

### **Rule VGNW**

Entry to lockup from an exception causes

- Any Fault Status Registers associated with the exception to be updated.
- No update to the exception state, pending or active.
- The PC to be set to 0xEFFFFFE.
- EPSR.IT to become UNKNOWN.

In addition, HFSR.FORCED is not set to 1.

### **Rule VGNW**

Entry to lockup from an exception causes

• Any Fault Status Registers associated with the exception to be updated.

Out of date Misleading Untestable

- No update to the exception state, pending or active.
- The PC to be set to 0xEFFFFFE.
- EPSR.IT to become UNKNOWN.

Ambiguous In addition, HFSR.FORCED is not set to 1.

# Arm Specification \_\_\_\_\_\_ C



Arithmetic operations **Boolean operations Bit Vectors** Arrays **Functions** Local Variables **Statements** Assignments **If-statements** Loops **Exceptions** 

Arithmetic operations **Boolean operations Bit Vectors** Arrays **Functions** Local Variables **Statements Assignments If-statements** Loops Exceptions


### **Formally Validating Specifications**




arm

### **Formally Validating Specifications**







### Public release of machine readable Arm specification

Enable formal verification of software and tools

Releases

April 2017: v8.2

July 2017: v8.3

Working with Cambridge University REMS group to convert to SAIL

Backends for HOL, OCaml, Memory model, (hopefully Coq too)

Tools: <u>https://github.com/alastairreid/mra\_tools</u>

Talk to me about how I can help you use it

### **Potential uses of processor specifications**

Verifying compilers

Verifying OS page table / interrupt / boot code

Verifying processor pipelines

Verification and discovery of peephole optimizations

Automatic generation of binary translators

Automatic generation of test cases

Decompilation of binaries

Abstract interpretation of binaries

etc.

# How can you trust formally verified software?

arm


© 2017 Arm Limited


### How can you trust formal specifications?

Test the specifications you depend on

Ensure specifications have multiple uses

Create meta-specifications





https://xkcd.com/1416/

43 © 2017 Arm Limited Hiring in Security and Correctness group — contact me

Thank You! Danke! Merci! 谢谢! ありがとう! Gracias! Kiitos!

### @alastair\_d\_reid

arm

"Trustworthy Specifications of the ARM v8-A and v8-M architecture," FMCAD 2016 "End to End Verification of ARM processors with ISA Formal," CAV 2016 "Who guards the guards? Formal Validation of ARM v8-M Specifications," OOPSLA 2017