## How can we formally verify Rust for Linux?

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Google Research

https://project-oak.github.io/rust-verification-tools/

#### The verification continuum



### Agenda

- What code to verify?
- What properties to verify?
- How can we use tools we have today?
- What needs fixed before this is viable?

## Spoiler: It is not usable yet

- Tool problems
- I didn't find bugs
- I didn't verify anything
- (I am now working on a new, unrelated project)

#### Detailed blog post <a href="https://project-oak.github.io/rust-verification-tools/">https://project-oak.github.io/rust-verification-tools/</a>

#### Using KLEE on Rust-for-Linux (part 3)

Aug 24, 2021

#### Using KLEE on Rust-for-Linux (part 2)

Aug 23, 2021

#### Using KLEE on Rust-for-Linux (part 1)

Aug 22, 2021



The Rust for Linux project is working on adding support for the Rust language to the Linux kernel with the hope that using Rust will make new code more safe, easier to refactor and review, and easier to write. (See the RFC for more detail about goals and for the varied responses of the Linux Kernel community.)

Back in April, I took a look at whether we could use our Rust verification tools on the Rust for Linux repo to provide further safety. Most of our work is based on the KLEE symbolic execution tool and I was able to get that to work. For reasons, I did not get to explore this very deeply after that but I thought it would be useful to describe what I was able to do and some of the questions raised by the work as a guide to how you might tackle the problem in the future.

I have split this blog into three parts because it was getting quite long. In this part, I'll start by looking at some key questions around what properties and code we want to check. The second part, will dive deeply into how to build Rust-for-Linux in a way that you can use KLEE on it. (Many people will want to skip this part.) And the final part, will return to the questions by creating test harnesses and stubs that could be used to check the Rust-for-Linux code for bugs.

As with the previous post on using KLEE with CoreUtils, my goal in this post is to help others to use tools from the formal verification community to check code like this rather than to do that checking myself. In particular, I will not find any bugs, I will not attempt to provide evidence that this is worth doing and I will not create a verification system that is ready to integrate into any project. These (and other limitations listed at the end of the last post) all need to be fixed before I would recommend that you try to use these tools as part of your regular workflow. But, I hope that this series will give you an ded model checkers with Linux series on using KLEE on the This second part, digs deeply ed tools like KLEE. (Warning: it ted in.) The final part will show described in this post are in this

LLVM bitcode files.

v the Rust for Linux

e will just focus on building to symbolically execute the


a few of them are a bit slow. ds into your shell in the


Linux, we are going to write a simple device driver written in Rust and I. It's worth repeating that the goal of or to find bugs in it. Instead, my goal is that verification yourself. You might st by creating better mocks and test lifferent answers to the questions in the KLEE that I described in the second in this branch of my fork of Rust for

harness like this

re>, FileState>(registration)?;


### What code to verify?






#1

Programmer & Compiler inserted checks



#### #2: State machines



- Many state machines in OS
  - Kernel, modules, devices, objects, etc.
- Check that state m/c changes are allowed
- See <u>Formal verification made easy and fast</u> (LPC 2019)

#### #3: System invariants

- Fast systems code has many invariants
- Executable invariants
  - assertions on function entry/exit

#### #4. Functional correctness

- 1. Write a formal specification of your code
- 2. Verify code against the specification
- 3. Update specification as code changes

# Writing verification harnesses (parameterized tests)

- 1. Write a test of your code using fixed values
- 2. Replace fixed values with parameters
  - a. Random values → fuzzing
  - b. Symbolic values → formal verification
- 3. Profit: one test that can be used in two ways

#### A concrete test

```
#[test]
fn test_fileops2() -> Result<()> {
    let registration = &RustSemaphore::init()?._dev;
    let file_state = *mk_file_state::<Arc<Semaphore>, FileState>(registration)?;
    let file = File::make fake file();
   test_write(&file_state, &file, 42);
   test_read(&file_state, &file, 6);
    0k(())
```

#### PropTest

What I want to write...

```
proptest! {
   #[test]
    fn test fileops2(wlen in 0..=1000usize, rlen in 0..=1000usize) >> Result<()> {
        let registration = &RustSemaphore::init()? dev;
        let file_state = *mk_file_state::<Arc<Semaphore>, FileState>(registration)?;
        let file = File::make fake file();
       test_write(&file_state, &file, wlen);
       test_read(&file_state, &file, rlen);
        0k(())
```

### PropTest and PropVerify

What I want to write...

```
proptest! {
   #[test]
    fn test fileops2(wlen in 0..=1000usize, rlen in 0..=1000usize) -> Result<()> {
        let registration = &RustSemaphore::init()?. dev;
        let file state = *mk_file_state::<Arc<Semaphore>, FileState>(registration)?;
        let file = File::make fake file();
        test_write(&file_state, &file, wlen);
        test read(&file state, &file, rlen);
        Ok(())
```

#### What works today

```
#[no_mangle]
pub fn test_fileops2() -> Result<()> {
    let wlen = AbstractValue::abstract value();
    let rlen = AbstractValue::abstract value();
    let registration = &RustSemaphore::init()?. dev;
    let file state = *mk file state::<Arc<Semaphore>, FileState>(registration)?;
    let file = File::make_fake_file();
    test write(&file state, &file, wlen);
    test read(&file state, &file, rlen);
    0k(())
```

#### How to run a verification tool

- 1. Write a parameterized test
- 2. Write stub functions for C code called from R4L
- 3. Generate LLVM bitcode: WLLVM, --emit=llvm-bc
- 4. Link bitcode files
- 5. Run verification tool (KLEE)

#### Tool issues today

(many of these are changing)

- 1. Cargo integration → couldn't use PropVerify
- 2. KLEE only for now  $\rightarrow$  finding bugs, not proving
- 3. LLVM11 vs LLVM12
- 4. No concurrency support

### Summary

- What code to verify
- What properties to verify

Compiler inserted checks, state machines, system invariants, ...

- Parameterized tests
  - Verification continuum (PropVerify and PropTest)
- Tool issues changing fast

## Thank You

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